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Since the Federal Reserve changed its monetary control 
procedures in late 1979, many observers have given the 
Fed credit for reducing the average rate of growth of the 
money supply. Some, however, have criticized the Fed for 
allowing interest rates to swing widely and the money 
supply to move far from its trend in the short run (from 
month to month, for example). These criticisms have 
challenged economists by raising the question of whether, 
by further modifying its monetary control procedures, the 
Fed could achieve all that its critics would like: less short-
run volatility in both money and interest rates as well as its 
desired long-run growth of money. 
This is really a question about the efficiency of the 
Fed's current procedures. In most models of short-run 
movements in monetary policy variables, interest rates are 
the link between the Fed's actions to control money and 
the growth of money soon thereafter. So, under any 
particular monetary control procedures, the more the Fed 
intervenes in money markets in an attempt to tighten con-
trol of money, the more interest rates fluctuate. These 
models indicate that changes in procedures can improve 
the Fed's ability to both control money and stabilize 
interest rates. But, according to the models, such changes 
are limited; ultimately the Fed faces a tradeoff between its 
short-run goals. When the Fed is using optimal proce-
dures—those that produce the best possible combinations 
of money and interest rate volatility—the Fed cannot 
simultaneously reduce the short-run volatility of both 
variables. It must accept more of one to produce less of the 
other. Only if the Fed is currently using inefficient 
procedures, that is, can it improve its short-run perfor-
mance by changing its procedures. 
The theoretical limit on the Fed's ability to improve its 
short-run monetary control procedures could be repre-
sented as a graph of all the combinations of money and 
interest rate volatility the Fed can achieve with efficient 
procedures. Economists refer to such a graph as a tradeoff 
curve because its shape tells the rate at which one good or 
goal can be exchanged for another. In this case, of course, 
it tells the rate at which the Fed could exchange better (or 
worse) short-run money control for larger (or smaller) 
interest rate movements by switching from one efficient 
control procedure to another. 
At any point in time, then, the question of whether new 
monetary control procedures could reduce short-run vola-
tility while still keeping average money growth on target 
can be answered by using actual data to estimate this 
tradeoff curve as well as the Fed's current position on or off 
it. If the combination of money and interest rate volatility 
the Fed has been achieving lately is not on the tradeoff 
curve, then the Fed's monetary control procedures are 
inefficient and both forms of volatility could be reduced by 
improving the procedures enough to move onto the curve. 
If the recent combination of volatilities is on the tradeoff 
curve, the Fed is already using efficient procedures, and 
the best it can do by altering its procedures is to exchange 
one form of volatility for the other by moving along the 
curve. Whether or not that sort of change is desirable 
depends on the relative importance the Fed attaches to 
short-run money control versus short-run interest rate 
smoothness. Nonetheless, an estimate of the shape of the 
tradeoff curve would provide a useful summary of the 
Fed's options. 
Despite the relevance of this sort of analysis to the 
l current monetary policy controversy, few economists 
have attempted to determine what the Fed's tradeoff curve 
really looks like and where it is in relation to recent levels of 
short-run money control and interest rate volatility. And, 
until now, no one has attempted to do that with optimal 
control theory, a mathematical technique designed to 
handle just this sort of problem of balancing competing 
goals. I applied optimal control theory to a statistical 
model of the linkages between weekly movements in the 
money supply and interest rates during the last seven years 
and found the model's implicit tradeoff between short-run 
money control and short-run interest rate smoothness 
since late 1979.1 also measured the actual degree of short-
run money control and interest rate smoothness associated 
with the Fed's monetary control procedures in the last few 
years.
1 
My estimates indicate that recently the Fed's proce-
dures have been fairly efficient. In other words, simulta-
neous improvements in both short-run money control and 
interest rate volatility are not likely because the Fed 
appears to have been operating near the tradeoff curve 
already. My estimates also show, however, that the trade-
off curve is almost flat: very small changes in the Fed's 
degree of money control are associated with large oppos-
ing changes in interest rate volatility. This means that the 
Fed could keep average money growth on target while 
reducing short-run interest rate volatility considerably 
from recent levels with at most a minor loss of short-run 
money control. But it also means that a significant increase 
in the degree of money control, from recent levels, would 
require a degree of interest rate volatility unprecedented 
even by recent experience. 
A Way to Balance the Fed's Competing Goals 
The Fed recognizes that moving closer to its goals for both 
money and interest rates can require changes in its 
operating procedures. Since the early 1970s, as concern 
about inflation has increased and more public attention 
has been focused on money growth, the Fed has slowly 
shifted its attention from controlling interest rates to 
controlling the money supply.
2 Starting early in 1970, the 
Fed began to produce targets for money growth to guide 
short-run policy. The instrument actually used to control 
money, however was the federal funds rate, the interest 
rate on short-term loans of the reserves of depository 
institutions. Because this rate tended to change slowly, 
money growth targets were often missed. Since 1975, 
Congress has required the Fed to report annual targets for 
money growth, and in October 1979, after several years in 
which money growth exceeded annual targets, the Fed 
announced a change in operating procedures which was 
designed to acquire better short-run (and, therefore, long-
run) control of money growth at the risk of introducing 
more interest rate volatility. 
Today even many of the Fed's critics admit that it has 
brought the trend growth of money closer to targeted levels 
since 1979. In recent years the center of controversy over 
monetary control has shifted from how well the Fed hits its 
long-run targets for money to how volatile money and 
interest rates are in the short run. Milton Friedman (1982), 
for instance, acknowledges that "the Federal Reserve ... 
did succeed in bringing down the average rate of growth in 
the quantity of money," but he argues that it must "recog-
nize the importance of curbing the erratic ups and downs in 
monetary growth" over short periods. At the same time, 
interest rate volatility has clearly been an important 
concern of the Fed's primary policymaking body, the 
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). Members of 
the FOMC have often expressed concern with the 
possibility of whipsawing the markets (see, for example, 
Volcker 1977, p. 26). This concern appears to have 
something to do with the Fed's role as a lender of last 
resort. Apparently, the fear is that increased rate volatility 
will increase the probability of a financial panic. This 
concern with money market conditions is discussed by 
Jack Guttentag (1972, p. 71), who defends it, arguing that 
"a good open-market strategy will permit adequate control 
over aggregates and have strong panic-prevention proper-
ties as well." 
Despite the Fed's recent experience, much research on 
improving monetary control procedures has been directed 
not at finding the Fed's best obtainable combinations of 
money control and interest rate volatility, but rather at a 
narrower issue: how to bring money closer to a chosen 
target without destabilizing interest rates. 
This issue appears to have arisen from a consideration 
1A more detailed description of this work is given in Litterman 1982. 
2Actually, before 1970, the Fed targeted money market conditions, a policy 
which basically involved holding short-term interest rates constant and accom-
modating fluctuations in money demand. A large literature has developed 
addressing the issue of whether a central bank should try to control interest rates 
or money. A well-known article by Poole (1970) shows that the answer may 
depend on the source of shocks to the economy. A more recent analysis by 
Kareken, Muench, and Wallace (1973) questions whether it is ever desirable to 
target money. I do not address this issue; I take as given the Fed's decision to try to 
control money growth. 
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The Federal Funds Rate's Role 
in Monetary Control 
There are some obvious differences between my discussion, in 
which the federal funds rate is the Fed's instrument for 
controlling money, and the usual discussion of current Fed 
operating procedures, which stresses nonborrowed reserves (that 
is, the total reserves of depository institutions less those 
borrowed from the Fed). Nonetheless, even under current Fed 
policy, there is an implicit role for the funds rate, and that role is 
the same as the one it plays in my discussion. 
Under current Fed policy, the causal chain which connects 
changes in the nonborrowed reserves path to changes in money 
holdings clearly includes the level of borrowings from the Fed. 
That level affects the federal funds rate and causes financial firms 
and the public to make portfolio decisions which return money 
holdings to the desired level. (See FRBNY 1981,1982 and FR 
Board 1981.) Thus, whether the focus is directly on the federal 
funds rate, as in my discussion, or on nonborrowed reserves, the 
fundamental link between the Fed's open market operations and 
the money supply is the effect of the Fed's actions on the funds 
rate. 
Although there is a good deal of uncertainty over what causes 
money to respond to changes in the funds rate, there is general 
agreement that an important role is played by banks, which 
respond rapidly to changes in the price of reserve credit. In the 
first several weeks after a change in the funds rate, it is banks' 
decisions to make or refuse commercial loans and to buy or sell 
assets which transmit changes in the funds rate to changes in 
of the lags inherent in the money control process. It is 
widely recognized that the Fed does not directly control 
the quantity of money. What the Fed does control is the 
supply of reserves to the financial system. Open market 
operations, by increasing or decreasing the supply of 
reserves, cause the federal funds rate, which is the price of 
reserves, to go down or up, respectively. These move-
ments in the federal funds rate cause banks and other 
economic agents to adjust their portfolios in ways that, 
other things unchanged, lead to predictable but somewhat 
delayed movements in the stock of money (see box). 
According to a number of Fed economists, these lags 
have restricted the Fed's actions to keep money growth on 
target in the short run because they imply that such actions 
can lead to drastic movements in interest rates.
3 The 
deposits and money. Banks do not respond directly to the level of 
reserves in the system, but rather to the current and expected 
future prices for reserves. At the margin, when deciding whether 
or not to make a loan, a bank compares the risk-adjusted rate of 
return on that loan with its alternative return from supplying 
those funds to the federal funds market. If other things don't 
change, when the funds rate goes up, for example, the level of 
bank loans and deposits, and hence the money supply, will go 
down. 
The Fed has not kept secret the fact that it will occasionally 
modify the growth in nonborrowed reserves to change the funds 
rate and affect the speed of monetary adjustment. But any 
consideration of how much to adjust the nonborrowed reserves 
path must face the following questions: What is the effect of the 
resulting change in borrowings on the funds rate? What is the 
response of money to changes in the funds rate? And, implicitly, 
what level of the funds rate is consistent with the desired path for 
money? Unless the Fed wants to instantaneously offset each 
unexpected deviation in money growth from that path, the use of 
the nonborrowed reserves targeting procedure does not eliminate 
the tradeoff between short-run money supply deviations and 
interest rate fluctuations. In this context, a policy prescription 
which suggests fixing the supply of reserves, no matter what 
happens to the money supply, amounts to telling the Fed to worry 
only about hitting money targets each week and to ignore the 
effects of interest rate fluctuations—fluctuations which might in 
fact be considerably sharper than those we have seen to date. 
arguments made by these economists are basically the 
same. Consider what happens when, for some reason, 
monetary growth accelerates sharply for a week or two. 
Because movements in interest rates have long-lasting 
delayed effects on money demand, action by the Fed to 
raise interest rates enough to quickly bring the money 
supply back to its target would continue to affect financial 
3A partial list includes Davis 1974a,b; Ciccolo 1974; Pindyck and Roberts 
1974, 1976; Tinsley et al. 1981; Higgins 1982; and Radecki 1982. Davis 
(1974b, p. 50), for example, suggests that if the Fed tried to exert tight control 
over money, "sharp week-to-week fluctuations in demand for bank credit and 
deposits ... would lead to erratic and large movements in the Federal funds rate 
and related rates " Pindyck and Roberts (1974, p. 224) argue that tight control 
over M1 would cause interest rates to "behave wildly" and to "oscillate between 
extreme values." The others all reach similar conclusions. 
3 markets for some time afterward, eventually pushing the 
money stock below its target and thus requiring offsetting 
actions by the Fed to lower interest rates. Depending on 
the lag in the response of money and the speed with which 
money was to be returned to its target, the required off-
setting movement in rates could be larger than the initial 
change, thus leading to an explosive cycle of interest rate 
oscillations. Since interest rates are the instrument the Fed 
uses to control the money supply, Robert Holbrook 
(1972), who first discussed this problem, called it instru-
ment instability. 
Attempts to determine how slowly the Fed should act 
to correct money deviations from a target in order to avoid 
instrument instability are misguided. Since the Fed faces 
an ultimate tradeoff between short-run money control and 
interest rate volatility, what it needs to know is where that 
tradeoff is, what are the best combinations of short-run 
money control and interest rate volatility it could possibly 
reach. Analyses of instrument instability merely tell the 
Fed how close it can come to one of its goals (short-run 
money control) without completely missing the other 
(smooth interest rate movements). Because these analyses 
ignore the question of what is optimal, they may be 
mistaken in concluding that, at any point in time, close 
short-run control of money necessarily requires excessive 
interest rate volatility. 
Gregory Chow (1973) was the first to point this out, 
and he also pointed out that there is a mathematical tech-
nique which can address the Fed's problem of competing 
goals. That technique, optimal control theory, was de-
veloped and is used most often by engineers, but it has 
many powers economists find helpful. The one Chow 
referred to is its ability to define the best balance between 
competing objectives in a system that evolves over time 
(like an economy). Several economists besides Chow 
have recognized the applicability of this theory to short-
run money control questions (see Davis 1974b and 
Pindyck and Roberts 1974, 1976). So far, however, no 
one has used it to calculate the Fed's tradeoff curve. 
Applying Optimal Control to Monetary Control 
In order to determine the best combinations of short-run 
money and interest rate volatility the Fed can achieve, I 
have applied optimal control theory to a simple time series 
model of U.S. money markets.
4 Once the Fed has chosen 
the relative weight it attaches to its competing goals of 
money control and stable interest rates, my optimal con-
trol technique tells the Fed how to best balance these goals 
by setting the federal funds rate each week according to an 
optimalfeedback rule, which is a linear function of current 
and past data on money, interest rates, and any other 
variables which help to predict future movements in the 
money stock.
5 Once calculated, this rule determines the 
probability laws of the model, which allow me to estimate 
the expected money deviations from target and interest 
rate volatility associated with the optimal control proce-
dures.
6 For any given degree of monetary control, that is, I 
can find the operating procedures which minimize the 
model's interest rate fluctuations. 
As discussed earlier, the best possible combinations of 
money control and interest rate volatility that these 
procedures allow the Fed to achieve can be summarized 
graphically in a curve. This curve is a possibility frontier, 
or tradeoff curve, that not only defines the best levels of 
money and interest rate movements the Fed can achieve. 
It also illustrates, by its shape, the fact that, once inefficient 
control procedures are superseded by optimal control 
procedures, the Fed can only trade increased money 
control for decreased interest rate stability, and vice versa.
7 
^Because of the controversy surrounding the question of whether the Fed can 
or should peg interest rates, it is important to address this question. What optimal 
control procedures produce is a suggested level for the funds rate at a given point 
in time. The level next period will depend on what information is observed this 
period. In contrast to the suggestions of Pindyck and Roberts (1974, 1976) and 
other control schemes, my procedures include no target for future interest rates. In 
my control scheme, if money deviates from its target, then the funds rate will 
eventually adjust as much as is necessary to bring money back to its desired path. 
Only within the shortest time interval—a week, in my model—is the funds rate 
held fixed, and even this degree of interest rate control is not necessary. 
5It would also be possible to use the feedback rule defined here under a 
reserves targeting procedure that would not be much different from current pro-
cedures. Today the FOMC picks a target for money growth, which the Federal 
Reserve Board and the Fed's Trading Desk translate into reserves path targets. 
Under an optimal control approach, the Board and the Desk could compute 
weekly reserves targets consistent with the funds rate given by the feedback rule. 
As long as the Fed is willing to cause the federal funds rate to move as needed to 
control the money supply, the difference between a funds and a reserves targeting 
procedure is not sharp. 
6Technical details of the computation of the optimal feedback rule are 
described in Litterman 1982. Along with the standard considerations, my rule 
takes into account the uncertainty in the coefficient estimates and the two-week 
lag between when we observe money and when we observe interest rates. 
The Tinsley et al. (1981) study, involving simulations of the Board's 
monthly money market model, reached conclusions similar to those reached here, 
although its approach differs in that Tinsley et al. did not adopt an explicit control-
theoretic framework, nor did they try to model the week-to-week dynamics of the 
money market. They found that there exists "a well-behaved trade-off between 
the volatility of deviations of M-1A from long-run targets and the volatility of 
short-term interest rates under current and alternative operating procedures that 
may be exploited by short-run monetary policy" (p.l). Similar conclusions were 
also reached by Pindyck and Roberts (1974, 1976) in earlier studies which did 
use optimal control but did not directly penalize interest rate volatility. 
4 Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review/Fall 1982 
A critical element in any application of optimal control 
theory to an economy is knowledge of how the economy 
evolves over time, or the dynamic behavior of the eco-
nomic system. I used time series analysis to estimate the 
dynamic relationships between weekly movements in 
money (defined as seasonally adjusted Ml, which basi-
cally includes currency and checkable accounts) and the 
federal funds rate in the period 1976-late 1982.
8 See 
Litterman 1982 for the details of my specification of the 
time series representation for these variables, that is, for 
the details on how I chose the variables and determined 
how to relate them in equations. Very briefly, I first 
searched for any variables besides the federal funds rate 
which would help forecast weekly movements in Ml. 
Having found that other variables help very little, I chose 
to include only M1 and the federal funds rate in the model. 
Several specifications were considered. The final choice, 
which included 12 lags of both variables in each equation, 
was based on maximizing the (out-of-sample) forecasting 
accuracy of the model. 
For the purpose of short-run monetary control, the 
important aspect of my estimated time series model is the 
response of Ml to movements in the federal funds rate. 
Ml responds to many different and usually unpredictable 
events, but the Fed's input can be viewed as being based 
on its response to the federal funds rate. Because this 
response appears to be relatively strong, stable across time 
periods, and insensitive to different specifications of the 
time series representation, my results can be considered 
relatively good indicators of what the Fed really can and 
cannot achieve. (Again, for evidence on this point, see 
Litterman 1982.) 
It is important to note as well, however, that despite the 
strong statistical relationship between money and the 
funds rate and the additional fact that much of the long-run 
behavior of money is attributable to movements in this 
rate, very little of the weekly variability of money is 
explained by these movements. The existence of a large 
amount of unexplainable noise in the weekly money stock 
series is an important factor in reducing the Fed's ability to 
use interest rates to achieve better short-run control of the 
money supply. 
My optimal control approach to monetary control 
outlined above is an attempt to formalize the Fed's 
operating procedures and its problem of how to best 
balance the goals of short-run money control and interest 
rate smoothness. Applying time series techniques to esti-
mate the dynamics of the Ml, federal funds process 
formalizes the FOMC's attention to the lags inherent in 
that process. Because the FOMC is, in effect, attempting 
to solve the same problem I am, but without the benefit of 
optimal control theory or time series analysis, its solution 
might be suboptimal. 
My Estimates of the Best the Fed Can Do 
The tradeoff between the Fed's two goals can be more 
easily understood by visualizing the costs of aiming at 
each. The cost to the Fed of striving to smooth interest 
rates is larger deviations of money from its target. For 
simplicity, I have used seasonally adjusted Mi's long-run 
(1976-late 1982) trend as its target. Using this trend does 
not necessarily represent actual Fed policy; it assumes the 
Fed was always basically hitting its long-run targets, an 
assumption which presumably overstates the true situa-
tion, at least before October 1979. For my purposes, 
which focus on short-run control, however, this is an 
adequate approximation. My estimates of the growth in 
the long-run trend support this assertion. Over the last 
several years, its growth has been slowly declining, which 
is quite consistent with the Fed's stated intentions. Chart 1 
shows this long-run trend along with the actual weekly 
levels of M1 between late 1979 and late 1982. Notice that 
a graph which focuses only on deviations from trend, as 
Chart 2 does, tends to exaggerate the importance of these 
movements: during this period they averaged only about 1 
percent of the level of Ml. The average size of these devia-
tions, as measured by their root mean square value, is the 
measure of monetary control which I assume the Fed 
wants to minimize as it tries to smooth interest rates. 
The cost to the Fed of trying to eliminate money stock 
fluctuations is more volatility in interest rates. Chart 3 
shows the weekly levels of the federal funds rate from late 
1979 to late 1982 and Chart 4 the corresponding values of 
my measure of interest rate volatility. Notice that when 
8The use of a time series representation as the basis for the dynamic structure 
of a control exercise is a departure from the standard econometric approach, 
which uses structural models. I decided not to estimate a structural model in this 
study because doing so would have greatly increased the cost and complexity of 
the exercise and probably would not have led to improved estimates. The usual 
identifying restrictions of a structural model are likely to be false, and their appli-
cation would lead to misspecification and therefore bias in the estimation of the 
crucial response function. Given the strength of the evidence in the data, as seen in 
the lack of sensitivity to alternative specifications, the results from using a 
reasonable structural model would presumably be similar to those I obtain with a 
time series representation. However, the risks of biasing results by imposing false 
restrictions and inappropriate specification of dynamic structures appear to far 
outweigh the expected benefit of possibly reducing the variance of the estimates. 
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Measuring the Costs of Short-Run 
Money Deviation and Interest Rate Volatility 
October 3,1979-November 3,1982 
Seasonally Adjusted M1  The Federal Funds Rate 
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Chart 3 Weekly Levels 
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Chart 2 Weekly Deviations From Trend  polntl
 Chart
4
 Weekly Volatility** 
1979  1980  1981  1982 
1979 1980  1981  1982 
*M1 's long-run trend is based on weekly data from January 7,1976, to November 3,1982. 
*The measure of volatility is the square root of a declining weighted average of squared changes 
in the federal funds rate from each of the 12 previous weeks. 
Source of basic data: Federal Reserve Board of Governors 
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interest rates move quickly in either direction, the volatility 
measure is large. My measure is the square root of a 
declining weighted average of squared changes in the 
federal funds rate from each of the 12 previous weeks. I 
assume that the expected value of this measure of interest 
rate volatility is the cost the Fed wants to minimize as it 
attempts to control money. 
Using these measures of costs in my model, I can 
present estimates of the minimum obtainable cost combi-
nations in a graph. Different relative weights attached to 
the goals of money control and interest rate smoothness 
will lead to different optimal feedback rules and thus to 
different points on the graph. Again, by connecting these 
points, I trace out the tradeoff curve, or possibility frontier, 
from which the Fed can choose optimal procedures. 
It should be clear that a tradeoff curve defines a broad 
set of possible feedback rules. Each point on the curve 
represents a feedback rule which is optimal for a particular 
weighting of the Fed's goals.
9 Deciding which rule should 
be chosen from this set means deciding how relatively 
important are the goals of money control and interest rate 
stability; that is beyond the scope of this analysis. What 
this analysis does tell the Fed is how costly, in terms of 
interest rate volatility, closer control of the money supply 
is (and vice versa). 
My estimates of both the tradeoff curve, based on the 
data since early October 1979, and the actual costs in this 
period are shown in Chart 5.
1
0
 Note that the curve is fairly 
flat and the actual is fairly close to it. Together these esti-
mates imply two main results: 
• Short-run money deviations from target cannot be 
reduced much from recent levels without incurring 
large increases in interest rate volatility. 
• Short-run interest rate volatility can be reduced quite 
a bit from recent levels without reducing the degree of 
money control. 
Readers familiar with the behavior of money and 
interest rates before October 1979 may find an apparent 
discrepancy between that behavior and my tradeoff curve. 
The tradeoff curve implies that more interest rate volatility 
is associated with closer control of the money supply. 
Since October 1979, however, both money deviations 
from trend and interest rate volatility have increased. This 
discrepancy does not refute the existence of the tradeoff 
curve. The tradeoff penalizes money deviations from 
target, not money growth volatility. The use of a trend 
Chart 5 
Money Control vs. Interest Rate Volatility 
in the Short Run 
Estimates of the Fed's Possibility Frontier 







50 100 150 200 250 
Interest Rate Volatility** (Basis Points) 
*The expected value of the root mean square deviation of seasonally 
adjusted M1 's deviations from its long-run (1976-82) trend. 
*The expected value of the square root of a declining weighted average 
of squared changes in the federal funds rate from the previous 12 weeks. 
Source of basic data: Federal Reserve Board of Governors 
growth rate for money as a basis for computing deviations 
from target badly underestimates the true situation before 
October 1979. Although there is no exact measure of how 
close the Fed has come to hitting its target, all indications 
9When there are innovations in the types of financial assets available, the 
behavior of M1 is sometimes less predictable than usual and the Fed then puts 
less weight on M1 targets. In my analysis, such times would suggest moving along 
the tradeoff curve toward less money control and more interest rate stabilization. 
Another possible response would be to attempt to control a different monetary or 
credit aggregate. Whether or not a different aggregate is controllable, however, 
and what the nature of that control would be are open questions. 
lOThe costs associated with points on the curve are measured by simulating 
the weekly time series model with the Fed following an optimal control procedure. 
The shocks in the simulation are taken to be those which actually occurred. By 
using these actual shocks, I can meaningfully compare the costs using optimal 
control with the actual costs in the historical period. 
7 are that the Fed has been closer to its desired trend growth 
path recently than it was several years ago. 
Even given the above qualifications, however, there is 
still a large increase in money stock volatility in recent 
years which my model does not account for. Some 
possible explanations include the increase in financial 
innovations, such as the nationwide introduction of check-
able interest-earning accounts in January 1981; the credit 
controls of spring 1980; the more general tightening of 
policy over the whole period; and finally, the fact that 
seasonal effects are harder to remove from recent data 
than from data around which there are several years of 
observations. In my analysis, these effects end up as 
unexplained shocks to money. Since the tradeoff curve I 
have estimated is based on shocks of the size experienced 
between late 1979 and late 1982, it does not apply to other 
periods. Whenever shocks to money are larger (or smaller), 
the tradeoff curve for that period will be higher (or lower) 
than the one in Chart 5. 
The model I used to calculate the tradeoff curve can 
also demonstrate how different the weekly history of 
money and interest rates might have been if the Fed had 
chosen an optimal procedure suggested by my results. 
Charts 6 and 7 compare the actual history of Ml and the 
federal funds rate during 1980-82 with what the model 
suggests could have been accomplished under an optimal 
control procedure which weighted stabilizing interest rates 
more highly than actual results imply the Fed did. The 
comparison suggests that the funds rate could have been 
smoothed considerably with little or no adverse effect on 
money control. Clearly, though, this particular optimal 
control solution does not promise to reduce money 
deviations from their current levels. Also, note that, while 
in this simulation the smoothed interest rate is usually 
lower than the actual rate, that will not generally be true. 
For example, in a period of falling rates, a smoothed rate 
will usually be higher than otherwise. 
A Closing Remark 
There is no guarantee that adopting optimal monetary con-
trol procedures would leave unaffected the important 
dynamics of the money market on which these procedures 
depend. In fact, there are good reasons to expect changes 
in government policy to affect market behavior.
1
1
 Since the 
Fed has recently been operating close to the tradeoff curve, 
however, the use of optimal control is appropriately 
viewed as a minor fine tuning of the Fed's current 
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Furthermore, there is evidence, described in Litterman 
1982, that the important response of money to interest rate 
movements did not change significantly when the Fed's 
operating procedures changed in October 1979. Money 
control procedures aimed simply at reducing interest rate 
fluctuations may be viewed as a compromise between the 
pre- and post-October 1979 regimes. With that as a goal, 
therefore, the impact on market behavior of switching to 
these procedures probably would not be large. 
1i See Lucas 1976 for a forceful attack on the type of analysis described here. 
See Sims 1982 for a forceful defense of it. 
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